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Abstract 
 
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in  Technique Financière et 
Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed 
the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in 
South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as 
greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in 
providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of 
transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the 
dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the 
course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks 
operating in several parts of the world.   
 
After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general 
social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former 
approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about 
the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the 
world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a 
good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then 
provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems 
to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining 
financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.   
 
 
Keywords: Development finance; institution building, credit rationing; corporate 
governance, networks 
 
JEL-Classification: O 16, 17 
 
 I. Introduction    
This paper is a follow up of an article published in Technique Financière et Développement 
four years ago
1 which discussed a new approach to financial sector development. That paper 
reported first efforts and successes of a strategy of creating "de nouvelles banques [de micro-
entreprise] plutôt que transformer des institutions existantes". It discussed in detail the 
experience of four “greenfield” or newly founded banks for small and micro-enterprises. Four 
years later, much more can be reported about this experience, which we claim is so far unique 
and, as we will argue, makes an important contribution to the development of the financial 
sectors of those countries in which the network banks operate. Still today, the salient feature 
of the financial systems of most developing countries and transition economies is the extent to 
which they are segmented or dualistic. The banks and the network aspire to help mitigate 
financial system segmentation.  
The paper of 2000 focussed on micro-enterprise banks in Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina (or 
B&H), Georgia, and Kosovo. Table 1 compares indicators of these banks between 1999 and 
2003.  
  FEFAD-Albania  MEB B&H  MEB Georgia   MEB Kosovo 
Founded as a 
bank in  
March 1999  October 1997  May 1999  January 2000 
Year end of   1999  2003  1999  2003  1999  2003  June 2000  2003 
Total assets (in 
Mio. $ or €) 
18,2  103,1  9,2  50,7  5,5  61,7  50,6  276 
Number of out-
standing loans  
1.007  9.003  2.171  10.761  1.635  10,653  177  16.007 
Volume of loans 
outstanding (in 
Mio $ or €)  
7,3  47,0  7.1  44,2  3.1  47,5  0,9  66,3 
Deposits (in Mio 
$ or €) 
8,6  80,3  0,6  10,6  0,1  17,7  46,8  256,0 
No. of branches  3  11  4  8  2  10 (plus 9 
outlets) 
3  7 
Total staff   62  258  54  216  40  404  80  262 
Full year profit  
(after taxes in 
Mio $ or €) 
0,07  0,64  0,25  0,48  -0,14  1,57  --  4,3 
Arrears rate   1,2%  1,25%  0,3%  0,6%  1,2%  1,6%  0,0%  0,17% 
 
Table 1: Key indicators of four micro-enterprise banks. 1999 figures are in US-$, 2003 
figures in Euro where appropriate. These and other data have been provided by IMI. 
 
There has been a tremendous growth in terms of lending activity and deposit-taking, which 
almost naturally goes together with a substantial increase of institutional and organisational 
complexity. However, two features have not changed at all: the portfolio quality and the target 
group orientation of the banks. Portfolio quality can be measured by the arrears rate indicating 
                                                 
1 See Schmidt and Zeitinger (2000) and the updated English language version in Schmidt and Zeitinger (2001).   2
the fraction of loans for which at least one payment is overdue for more than 30 days (see last 
line of Table 1). The most telling indicators of target group orientation are the average size of 
the loans and the proportion of loans below 10.000 €. As when they were created, the banks 
remain clearly focussed on the small end of the market or, in other words, on clients which 
have typically not had access to loans from other financial institutions. The market segment of 
small and very small – or “micro” – and small enterprises (MSEs) remains grossly under-
served or completely disregarded by existing banks in almost all developing and transition 
economies. It may now be easier to obtain a loan of above 50,000 € than it was five years ago. 
But especially for small businesses people, loans below this size are still very hard to get. The 
average loan size of the four banks covered in Table 1 has been 3.700 $ at the end of 1999 and 
stands slightly above 3.000 € at the end of 2003, and the fraction of genuine micro-loans 
below 10.000 € still stands at around 93 percent.  
Probably the most important feature of change, which cannot be reflected in Table 1, is the 
network to which these four banks belong. The focus of this paper is on the development of 
this network. In this paper, we will characterise the development of a network of MSE banks 
which operate in developing countries and transition economies. This network has been set up 
and is coordinated by two closely related companies located in Frankfurt, Germany. One is 
the investment company Internationale Mikro-Investitionen-AG (IMI), and the other one is 
the consulting firm Internationale Projekt Consult GmbH (IPC). After placing this experience 
into the broader contexts of financial development and development policy in section II, we 
discuss the development of this network and the merits and the problems of creating new 
banks within a network structure in section III. Section IV summarises and concludes.  
II. The context and the background  
1.  The importance of financial sector development and of small and very small    
     enterprises  
For bankers, politicians and policy-oriented economists, it has always been self-evident that 
the financial sector of a country is of great importance for economic development. Probably 
the best known author who has emphasised this fact was Schumpeter, who, in his theory of 
capitalistic development (1911), portrays the banker as the partner of the entrepreneur, to 
whom he ascribes the role of innovation based on “creative destruction”.  
However, under the influence of the neoclassical theory of economic growth the economic 
profession largely lost sight of the importance of the financial sector for a long time. Even the 
so-called new theory of economic growth, associated with the names of Lucas and Romer,   3
only acknowledged the importance of finance in general, but did not give it the attention 
which it deserves.  
It was mainly practice and policy driven research which rectified this deficiency. The 
beginning was made in the 1989 World Development Report (World Bank, 1989), dedicated 
to the relationship between development and finance. This led to a wave of empirical studies 
which confirmed unambiguously that finance is important for economic development and that 
– to quote King and Levine, two pioneers in this line of research  - “Schumpeter might be 
right” (1993). This is now generally accepted and has started to influence development policy.   
However, almost all self-employed people and owners of small and very small commercial 
and industrial establishments are not “Schumpeterian dynamic entrepreneurs”. Instead of 
innovating and initiating industrial revolutions, their concern is to assure a decent living for 
themselves, their families and the few employees which they may have. In this respect, 
Schumpeter was not right, since he did not hold these “survivors” in high esteem, even though 
they form the basis of economic well-being and moderate progress in most countries. This 
applies in particular to developing countries and the economies in transition, in which the 
large state-owned enterprises no longer provide most employment: Overall, about half of the 
employment in these countries is in small and micro-scale establishments. Just like existing 
large firms and the few innovating entrepreneurs, the owners of small and very small busi-
nesses seek credit and other banking services.   
Most established banks do not cater to these people, and this if for two reasons. One is that 
they do not know how to lend to them at reasonable costs and risks; the second reason is that 
they do not consider this clientele as commercially attractive. This assumption is not correct, 
but it seems sufficiently convincing to most established bankers to justify their failure to 
engage a large part of the economically active population.  
It is exactly this neglected clientele which forms the target group of SME banks. They are not 
the poorest of the poor, who have other and more urgent concerns than credit, and might only 
be pushed into indebtedness if they were to take out loans; and they are not those who have 
access to credit from established banks anyway. They are the lower middle class of develop-
ing and transition countries. Though this does not apply to each and every individual small or 
micro-enterprise, as a group these firms have the economic potential to generate income and 
employment; and they can pay the price of loans, provided that this price reflects moderate 
costs.   4
Microfinance is not about picking potential Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, but about making a 
decent form of survival possible and easier, thereby enabling small and micro-scale estab-
lishments to grow at least moderately. Enabling and encouraging business people to aspire 
and achieve some growth in their businesses is extremely important for economic develop-
ment. But in the present situation in most countries, the incentives to aspire even moderate 
growth are weak, and most micro-entrepreneurs are well aware that growth can lead them into 
a dilemma: Loans from informal lenders and from credit granting NGOs are available in most 
countries, but they are very costly and rarely exceed 3 to 5.000€. Thus, they are no longer 
sufficient for growing enterprises. At the same time, these enterprises are too small for loans 
from conventional banks. The combination of an upper limit for informal and semi-formal 
loans and a lower limit for bank loans lead to a gap in the supply of credit which seriously 
impedes the growth of individual firms and aggregate growth. One perspective of develop-
mentally responsible microfinance is to bridge this gap and thereby to enable and encouraging 
growth.
2   
2. Traditional approaches to financial sector development and MSE financing   
Development policy with respect to financial sector development and MSE financing has 
gone through various stages. For many years after the Second World War, development 
finance mainly consisted of transferring large amounts of foreign funds to governments and 
big, often state owned, enterprises for large-scale projects. The expectation was that growth of 
big firms and improvements of infrastructure would “trickle down” to improve the situation of 
the general population including MSEs. In some few cases, this strategy worked well, but in 
most cases it only fuelled a dualistic development which made broad segments of the 
population poorer. It was even explicitly aimed at eliminating the informal business sector.  
This policy of development finance was consistent with the general policy of financial repres-
sion, which prevailed at that time in most countries. In the early 1970s, Shaw (1973) and 
McKinnon (1973) severely criticised this policy. Their criticism had some impact and lead to 
a wave of liberalisation in some parts of the world. But contrary to early expectations, liber-
alisation did not increase the access to credit for small and even informal business. Banks 
simply had other interests to pursue in the newly liberalised environments.  
At the same time, another approach to small and micro-scale business financing became 
fashionable and was tried out in thousands of projects during the 1980s. It consisted in 
channelling micro-loans through various institutions which were not banks and even made a 
                                                 
2 See Tschach, 2002, for a formal development of this role of MSE finance.   5
point of not being and appearing to be bank-like. A preferred institutional form was that of 
credit-granting NGOs. But in general this approach also did not work, mainly because its 
costs were so exorbitant – and the level of professionalism so low – that there was little hope 
of achieving a scale of activity which would have produced cost-efficiency and ultimately 
financial sustainability.  
A way out of this dilemma, which had numerous followers in the 1990s, seemed to be the 
strategy of “upgrading” credit granting NGOs and similar organisations. The earlier paper in 
this journal mentioned above explained why this is also not the key to success. Since the end 
of the millennium, our criticism has been generally accepted, paving the way for the new 
approach of creating target group-oriented banks from scratch.  
3. Experience of MSE banking along commercial lines  
In the early 1990s, the concept of commercially oriented micro-finance gained some follow-
ers, though certainly not general acceptance. For some observers and practitioners, it had 
become more and more obvious that merely distributing money in the legal form of small 
loans to poor people and micro-entrepreneurs and of just hoping that these borrowers would 
pay the money back when it would be due could not be pursued on a grand scale. Therefore it 
could never make a contribution to the development of financial sectors and ease the 
problems of large numbers of small business people. To have any relevant impact, micro-
finance institutions would also have to have considerable outreach, which in turn presupposes 
that administrative costs and loan losses are low. One benchmark, which seemed extremely 
ambitious at that time, was that the sum of annualised administrative costs and loan losses 
should not exceed 20 percent of the average outstanding micro-loan portfolio of that year. It 
was rightly assumed that this level of lending costs could be passed on to MSE borrowers 
who typically sought very small loans for a short time. Ultimately, these insights led to the 
creation of commercially oriented microfinance institutions in Asia and Latin America.  
A first step in the development of commercially oriented microfinance was to design and 
implement lending techniques with low costs and built-in repayment incentives. One attempt 
was group lending. Another was individual lending with a strong emphasis on standardised 
but thorough assessment of the repayment capacity of potential borrowers and the implicit 
promise that a borrower who repaid his loan fully and on time would have a fair chance of 
getting another loan when it was requested. In combination with a heavy dose of IT to support 
the operations, it turned out that repayment rates could be kept sufficiently high and adminis-  6
trative costs sufficiently low that in principle sustainable micro-lending could become a 
commercially attractive proposition and therefore also a sound development strategy.  
But lending technology was not enough. Financial institutions were required which were 
capable and willing to implement such a technology on a large scale, and which would make 
the implicit promise of further loans credible by signalling that they are here to stay and to be 
there when a client comes back for another loan. Evidently, only financial institutions which 
are financially sustainable – and which are recognised as being stable - would be able to make 
this promise of later rewarding sound repayment of loans, and only sustainable institutions 
would be in a position to attract deposits which could be used for lending. This is how institu-
tion building became part of the agenda of development finance.  
Apart from the operational challenge which institution building posed, there were the m ore 
far-reaching and more fundamental questions of governance and ownership of the micro-
finance institutions which were to be created. Ownership in developmentally relevant institu-
tions is not just a question of political correctness or of the source of  funding. Rather it 
concerns who would be interested and able to determine and shape the growth and the current 
operations of these institutions in such a way that they can become stable and grow while 
maintaining their development focus.  
The consulting firm Internationale Project Consult (IPC) was one of the industry leaders that 
succeeded in setting up microfinance institutions which achieved financial sustainability in 
several countries in the 1990s. This was first done in Latin America, and later also in other 
parts of the world. But IPC learned rather soon that the conventional strategy en vogue at that 
time of building up formal microfinance institutions by upgrading existing NGOs was not 
appropriate. It takes too long, is too costly, and almost always creates opposition of those who 
had initially set up the institutions to be transformed. Quite rightly, these “incumbents” fear 
that transformation and formalisation undermine their personal influence. Therefore, they tend 
to resist these changes even though they would clearly be in the interests of the target popula-
tion. This experience inspired IPC to look for alternatives. One of these is to build up MSE 
banks from scratch or as “greenfield investments”.   
III. A network of MSE banks in developing and transition economies  
1. The creation of an investment company to support microfinance institutions 
After the Dayton Accord of 1996, IPC was commissioned to build up a microfinance bank in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina "from scratch". The investors were a group of international finance 
institutions (IFIs), including the EBRD, the World Bank affiliate IFC and the Dutch FMO.   7
Inspired by the practice of venture capital financing, one of them, the IFC, promoted the idea 
that strong incentives for the so-called technical implementer to succeed in the extremely 
difficult environment of post-war B&H would be created by requiring IPC to also take over 
an equity share in the new bank.
3 Although IPC felt that they did not need this additional 
incentive since their professional reputation as an institution builder was at stake and that this 
would by itself provide a powerful incentive anyway, the consulting firm accepted the 
invitation to become a shareholder. This first case with a consultant as a co-investor in a new 
microfinance institution seemed encouraging to all parties involved in this project, and it led 
to making the rule out of what started as an exception. However, IPC as a family-owned 
“small business” did not have sufficient funds to undertake shareholdings in a n umber of 
MSE banks patterned on the successful case of the "Micro-Enterprise Bank" in B&H.  
This is how the idea was born to set up an investment company which is closely related to 
IPC, in which IPC is the largest shareholder, but which also seeks other shareholders. This 
investment company, Internationale Mikro-Investitionen AG (IMI), was founded in 1998 as a 
joint stock corporation under German law with an initial equity of about 1 Mio. €. The group 
of founding shareholders were IPC, IPC Invest GbR (comprising a group of IPC staff 
members who believe in the commercial success of the IPC approach), the Dutch DOEN 
Foundation, the German DEG and the Bolivian foundation ProCredito. Thus, with one excep-
tion the original shareholders were private institutions and persons. In the course of time and 
as IMI made a series of investments and grew considerably, other shareholders from the ranks 
of the IFIs joined, first FMO in 1999, then IFC in 2000, and later the Belgian BIO and the 
German KfW. At the end of 2003, IMI's total equity stands at almost 45 Mio. €. Table 2 
shows its current shareholder composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 As Ahmed (2003, p. 73) points out, the IFC "believe(s) that an essential reason for the success .... is that the 
management service provider – IPC – participates in the ownership of these banks ... This is a model that IFC 
fought hard for. There were many who claimed that linking management services with ownership meant conflict 
of interest, whereas we believed it aligns interests."      8
Shareholder  Share in the 
equity of IMI (%) 
IPC GmbH  19,4 
IPC-Invest GbR  7,2 
DOEN-Foundation   15,6 
Pro Credito  6,0 
KfW-Group (DEG & KfW)   14,3 
IFC   15,7 
FMO   14,4 
BIO   7,3 
Table 2: Shareholder composition of IMI as of end 2003 
2. The IMI investments: A set of specialised banks for small and very small enterprises 
It had always been the intention of the creators of IMI that this investment company should be 
the nucleus of a network of banks specialised in providing all kinds of financial services, and 
not merely credit, to small and very small enterprises in developing and transition countries. 
In most cases, the banks in which IMI became a shareholder, were newly founded, and set up 
and managed by IPC. In a few other cases, IMI invested in banks which had existed for some 
time, some of which had been created by IPC in earlier years.   
The first IMI investments were those dealt with in the earlier article in Technique financière et 
developpement. Relatively soon other banks were added to the list of IMI investments. 
Currently IMI has investments in 19 banks, mostly in South-East Europe and Latin America, 
but also one in Asia and currently three in Africa (one of them in the process of being 
created). Table 3 provides the original names of the banks – most of them have recently been 
renamed “ProCredit Bank” so that they can be recognised as being part of an international 
network and benefit from a common corporate identity - , the year in which IMI invested in 
them, their paid-in equity at that time, the size of their current loan portfolios and the amount 
and the fraction of the equity which IMI currently holds.    
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First IMI 
Investment  December 2003 
Institution (Reporting Ccy)  Date 
Amount 
(in mio 
USD or 
€)  
Gross Loan 
Portfolio (in 
mio USD or 
EUR) 
Paid-in-Capi-
tal (in mio 
USD or €) 
IMI Invest-
ment (in 
mio. USD or 
€) 
IMI 
share 
(in %) 
Caja Los Andes Bolivia ($)  03/1999  0,4  80,40  7,40  4,2  32,3 
MEB B&H (€)  04/1999  0,5  44,20  8,00  2,7  33,7 
MEB Kosovo (€)  12/1999  0,4  66,30  10,00  1,7  17 
MCN Haiti ($))  01/2000  0,4  5,70  2,00  0,5  25 
FEFAD Albania (€)  02/2000  0,8  47,00  7,50  1,1  15 
MEC Moldova ($)  02/2000  0,2  6,50  0,50  0,2  40 
Financiera Confia Nicaragua ($)  07/2000  0,5  25,30  3,00  2,4  81 
NovoBanco Mozambique ($)  10/2000  0,4  2,90  3,00  0,8  26,7 
MFB Ukraine ($)  11/2000  0,5  58,80  15,00  3,0  20,00 
MBG Georgia ($)  01/2001  0,2  47,50  10,00  3,6  36 
Fianciera Calpia El Salvador ($)  01/2001  2,4  66,20  13,00  4,2  32,3 
SFE Ecuador ($)  03/2001  1  22,00  5,80  3,9  70,0 
ProCredit Bulgaria(€)  06/2001  1,2  80,10  12,00  2,6  21,7 
MIRO Bank Romania ($)  01/2002  0,3  26,60  13,50  1,6  11,9 
Sikhaman Ghana ($)  04/2002  0,8  1,50  2,00  0,7  35 
MFB Serbia (€)  05/2002  0,5  75,70  12,00  2,0  16,7 
ProCredit Bank, Macedonia (€)  05/2003  1,6  7,50  5,00  1,6  32 
Angola ($)  11/2003  4,9  NA  4,9  1,4  28,6 
 
Table 3: The IMI investment portfolio (current values in € or $ as indicated) 
As Table 3 shows, the IMI portfolio of equity participations has greatly increased over the 
past years. There are three dimensions of growth. One is the sheer number of investments; the 
second one is the result of the fact that the banks themselves have grown very fast (see 
below). In order to maintain its influence as an owner, IMI has regularly participated in 
capital increases which were necessary to support the growing loan volume according to 
established banking regulation. The third dimension of growth is that since 2002 IMI aspires 
to increase its ownership share in the banks because this strengthens the ties between the 
banks and, under certain conditions, allows the transfer of deposits from banks in the network 
which have surplus deposits to banks with less success in deposit mobilisation.  
3. The network of shareholders  
IMI has networks at two levels. One is the network of shareholders, investors and providers of 
technical assistance. The other one is the network of the banks themselves. The shareholder 
structure of eight banks in South-East Europe represented in Table 4 is largely identical. To a 
large extent, the IFIs which hold shares in IMI are also shareholders in the individual banks. 
For instance, in the case of MFB Serbia the equity is divided in six equal shares. One is held 
by IMI, one each by three IFIs which are shareholders in IMI (IFC, FMO and KfW), one by 
EBRD and one by Commerzbank. EBRD has been a major provider of technical assistance 
for setting up the banks and of credit lines, and is therefore a stakeholder in the network   10
without being an IMI shareholder. Commerzbank is a big private German bank which joined 
the network some time ago.  
Ownership 
structure  Albania  Bosnia  Bulgaria  Georgia  Kosovo  Romania  Serbia  Ukraine 
KfW group 
(DEG & KfW)  25,0%  7,7%  20,0%  10,0%  16,7%  20,8%  16,7%  20,0% 
IFC  20,0%  23,1%  18,3%  16,0%  16,7%  19,0%  16,7%  20,0% 
FMO  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  16,7%  6,5%  16,7%  0,0% 
IMI  15,0%  33,6%  21,7%  39,0%  16,7%  11,9%  16,7%  20,0% 
Commmerzb.  20,0%  12,5%  20,0%  3,0%  16,7%  20,8%  16,7%  0,0% 
EBRD   20,0%  23,1%  20,0%  20,0%  16,7%  20,8%  16,7%  20,0% 
Others   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  120,12%  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0% 
Total Capital  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0% 
 
Table 4: Shareholder composition in eight IMI banks in South-East Europe>  
There are three arguments in favour of having a network of owners and associated supporters. 
One is that it makes it easier to pursue a similar strategy and apply the same business model 
consistently in all banks. After all it is the adherence to the concept of having banks which 
pursue a clear developmental mission and are at the same time determined to do this in a 
commercially sound way, which allowed the network to emerge and which keeps it together. 
The second argument is that the similar ownership structure makes the transfer of valuable 
resources, that is, personnel, funds and know-how, from one institution to the other very easy. 
As we will show later, this transfer is essential for the business model of the banks. With a 
different ownership, any transfer of resources could pose a problem since it is never 
completely clear what a correct transfer price should be. Any transfer might imply the danger 
that one group of owners feels that the terms under which the transfer occurs are not in their 
favour. This is all the more important in the case of know-how; and know-how and learning 
are, again, essential determinants of success in an innovative business like commercial MSE 
banking.  
The third argument is that the similarity of ownership greatly facilitates centralised control of 
the banks and furthers good governance in the entire network. Currently, this control is jointly 
exercised by IPC and IMI in Frankfurt. In principle, this might create an agency problem 
since IPC is a private company which works on a for-profit basis. However, having several 
shareholders in IMI also as shareholders in the individual banks and on the boards of these 
banks provides ample opportunities for them to monitor how well IPC and IMI manage the 
network and possibly also to intervene in appropriate ways if the network management should 
appear wanting (for details see Schmidt and Tschach, 2003).      11
4. The network of banks 
The second level of networks is that between the banks themselves. Imagine how a bank is set 
up. A team of experts visits a country to determine if an MSE bank would be useful and 
commercially feasible there. The experts entrusted with this job have learned in other coun-
tries how to assess the demand for and the requirements of the operations of such a bank. At 
the next step, business systems such as the accounting and management information systems 
need to be put into place. These systems are taken from the other banks where their effective-
ness has been tested. Moreover, local staff who will work at the new bank need to be trained. 
To a large extent, this is done by sending them to another bank in the network, where they 
gain practical experience before the new bank opens its doors. Finally, experience confirms 
that having the network structure in place makes it much easier to obtain a banking license. 
The argument that the same set of investors and managers have built up MSE banks in 
countries A, B and C which function well and which operate in exactly the way as the new 
bank will, is very helpful in convincing the bank supervisor in country D of the merits of the 
proposed new bank in his country. This is important since bank supervisors tend to share the 
common reservations of most established bankers vis-à-vis MSE banks and their viability. 
Together these factors explain why all IMI banks are fully operational from the day they open 
their doors and why the time required for setting up a new bank is relatively short. 
Banking is a people business. When the bank is up and running, there will often be a person, 
local or foreign, who shows extreme capability and motivation. Such a person is highly valu-
able, but he or she may also be inclined to change jobs to further his or her career. Being able 
to offer him or her an advancement opportunity may not always be easy in just one bank. But 
if several banks operate in similar environments with English as the common working 
language and with a similar corporate culture, this is much easier.  
Banking is also a knowledge business. It would never have been possible to create a network 
of banks if the experience gained in one case could not be transferred and used in other cases. 
Know-how transfer concerns strategic and operational aspects such as lending techniques and 
IT/MIS, the design of internal promotion paths, incentive schemes, product design, auditing 
techniques and loan documentation. Having a network of banks between which information 
flows freely is an efficient way of lowering the one-time costs of learning and innovation. For 
instance, the MSE bank in Kosovo was the first in the network – and in the country - to intro-
duce ATMs. This was a learning experience, and it was costly. Now this knowledge is being 
transferred at low cost to other MSE banks in the region.    12
5. An assessment of the banks in the network 
The network currently comprises 19 banks. Those in South-East Europe are the largest group. 
They have been founded between 1996 and 2003, and they are the fastest growing part of the 
network. The second group are the banks in Latin America. The largest two among them are 
by now relatively old, which explains why they do not grow as fast as the others. They were 
created by IPC as consultants in the early 1990s. The smallest group, the “rest of the world 
group”, are those in the Philippines, in Haiti and in Africa. They differ from the others in two 
respects. Most of them have a strong local shareholder, typically a local bank, and they are 
much smaller than the others. This is why we do not refer to them in what follows.  
One standard of performance is the size and the growth of the loan portfolio. Currently the 
banks in the network have a combined portfolio of 300,000 outstanding loans amounting to 
more than 600 Mio. €. As Figure 1 shows, the banks’ loan portfolios grow on average by 
about 30% per year in South-East Europe and slightly less in Latin America.
4 IMI anticipates 
that loan portfolio growth is likely to continue for the coming years and expects the combined 
portfolio to exceed 1 billon (or 1,000 Mio.) € in 2006 
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 Figure 1: The development of the loan portfolio of the ten largest banks in the IMI network  
                                                 
4 The presentation in Figure 4 is adjusted for exchange rate changes, so that the growth expressed in Euros is 
much lower than the growth in numbers of loans or than it would be if one disregarded the 2003 development of 
the Euro-Dollar exchange rate. All Latin American banks, and some others, provide their accounts in Dollars.   13
As a group, the banks currently have total assets of 950 Mio.€. They employ more than 4.300 
people, 99 percent of whom are local or from the respective region; only one percent are 
foreign advisors who, for the time being, are at the helms of these banks. Thus the banks also 
make a considerable contribution to human capital creation in their host countries. Since the 
staff is very well trained in technical and ethical aspects, and some will eventually change 
jobs and go to other banks, this human capital development itself is a contribution to financial 
sector development.  
The second standard of assessment is the size distribution of loans. It seems desirable from a 
development standpoint and especially for poverty alleviation that the IMI microfinance 
banks do not lose their traditional orientation towards small and very small business clients. 
On the other hand, if these people obtain loans and use them wisely their businesses grow and 
clients come back asking for larger loans in later rounds. Moreover, in order to be stable and 
profitable, the banks also have to lend not only to micro enterprises, but also to small and in 
some cases even to medium sized enterprises.  
About two out of three loans had initial sizes below 1,000 €, and more than 95 percent are 
below 10,000 €. In volume terms, the corresponding fractions are 10 percent (“micro-micro” 
below 1,000 €) and 45 percent ("micro" below 10,000 €). For both subgroups of micro-loans 
together, the average loan size is slightly above 1000 €. Of course, there are regional differen-
ces. What one would call a small loan in Latin America and even more so in Africa would be 
regarded as a genuine micro-loan in South-East Europe. The distribution of loan sizes is 
almost completely stable in each of the three groups of banks or the three regions, only the 
relative importance of the groups is shifting in favour of the banks in South-East Europe so 
that the average loan size in the entire network increases.   
The third assessment standard of the banks in the network is the risk of their lending opera-
tions. For this, two measures can be employed. One is capital at risk, which is defined here as 
the total amount of that fraction of outstanding loans for which at least one payment is over-
due – i.e. not just the amount which is overdue – for 30 days or more. The other measure is 
the fraction of loans (in volume terms) which have to be written off per year. These measures 
differ between the regions. In South-East Europe, the arrears rate stands at about 1 percent, 
and the annual write-offs are well below 1 percent. In Latin America, both figures are at the 2 
percent level. Thus, one can say that the losses which the banks experience with a clientele 
that is considered as particularly risky by conventional bankers are not higher than those of 
most banks in industrialised countries.    14
But of course there are risks, and the banks need to be cushioned to absorb them. Typically, of 
course, the write-offs become necessary for loans which have been in arrears before, so that 
one cannot add these two numbers. Overall, the reserves for loan losses which the IMI banks 
have accumulated, are about twice as high as their capital at risk.  
The fourth standard of assessment is profitability, which depends in part on the age of a given 
bank. In the first year they can hardly be profitable, in the second year, a typical IMI bank 
reaches its break even point, and in its third year it starts to generate profit. In fact, by the end 
of 2003, only five very small banks were not yet profitable. Overall, the return on equity of 
the banks in the network, measured in book value terms and weighted by the banks’ equity, is 
above 10 percent. What may be surprising to some observers is this. Even if one counted the 
start-up subsidies, which most of the banks have received from international donors for a 
limited span of time, as equity, the return on the “adjusted equity” would still be close to 10 
percent in the network as a whole.
5  
One can summarise this section by saying that as a group the banks performed very well in all 
relevant dimensions. Not a single investment has turned out to be a failure. However, there 
are differences, and there have been problems with individual banks at certain times. But in 
all cases, these problems have been solved, and in some cases this required the active support 
of the shareholders in IMI.  
6. The assessment of IMI as a network 
The performance of IMI as a developmentally oriented investment is quite good. First, with 
its close cooperation with IPC, IMI has played a leading role in establishing a network of 
banks which is unique in its line of business. There are now several other groups, typically 
also set up by so-called technical implementers like IPC, which have admittedly copied the 
IMI model, but to our knowledge none has so far been able to assemble a sizable investment 
portfolio or to create new banks.  
In financial terms, IMI can not be as successful as its portfolio of investments because of the 
costs it bears as an intermediary. But even if one measured IMI’s financial performance only 
by the book values of its investments or, what amounts to the same thing, applied a really 
strict principle of prudence, it compares favourably with that of the stock market for the last 
four years. During this time, IMI has created a well functioning network of MSB banks, 
which has produced more value for IMI's investors than is reflected in its financial accounts.  
                                                 
5 All of the data reported here can be obtained on the IMI website (www.imi-ag.de), and with the exception of 
those referring to the end of 2003, all come from audited accounts.    15
What is the role of the network in this respect ? As we said above, one aspect of the network 
is the close cooperation between IMI, IPC and IMI’s other shareholders. There is no doubt 
among the members in the network of shareholders and other supporters that the success of 
the banks owes much to the approach of building commercially and developmentally relevant 
microfinance institutions developed and implemented by IPC and to the close control over the 
banks which IPC and IMI jointly exercise. The leading local staff of the banks consider them-
selves as belonging to an international group of banks and not merely to their own bank.  
The main role of the other investors in IMI and in the banks is that they provide the bulk of 
the funding for the growth of the banks. The equity of the banks h as grown alongside the 
growth of IMI’s equity, and the shareholders have supported this growth. As shareholders in 
the banks, the IMI shareholders and those “network affiliates” who are not IMI shareholders, 
have also provided or helped to secure the technical assistance which is required, or at least 
seemed to be required in the past, to set up a bank with a small business orientation in difficult 
environments in which conventional banks would either not venture at all or in which they 
would rather seek only well-to-do clients.  
In addition to finance, the other shareholders in IMI and in the banks provide governance and 
moral support for the approach implemented by IPC. This could suggest still another role for 
the public development organisations with a m andate to support MSEs worldwide which are 
shareholders both in IMI and in the banks: They could have the role of guardians of the 
developmental mission of IMI and the banks. However, in the case of IMI – and probably in 
the similar networks mentioned above, which are being created – the developmental orienta-
tion of the private partners is not less than that of the public partners. Conversely, no one of 
the two “camps”, i.e. the camps of the private and the public stakeholders, is generally more 
commercially oriented than the other. In fact, the similarity of values and views is probably 
the reason why the partnership has worked well so far (see also Ahmed, 2003).   
To return to the close cooperation between the banks and the possibility of transferring best 
practice within the network: It is the task of IMI and IPC to make this transfer possible, and it 
should be apparent if a complex organisation like the IMI network is successful in its efforts 
to learn and to transfer and use the learning. And this is indeed the case. As isolated banks, 
none of them would perform as well as they do now. Moreover, learning and know-how trans-
fer should speed up growth in business, profitability and impact. The time path of the 
development of the individual institutions has changed greatly over the years. Banks which 
have been created later take less time to reach the break-even point, at which they cover all   16
current costs, and the pay-back point at which their accumulated profits are sufficient to 
recoup the all their establishment costs. This increase in the banks’ growth rates is reflected in 
Figure 2 which shows how the loan portfolio growth of the eight IMI banks in South-East 
Europe have developed during their first two to three years. The younger the banks are (see 
the year of establishment of the institutions on top of the table), the faster they grow.  
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Figure 2: Loan portfolio growth of 8 IMI banks in South-East Europe(loans in Mio. €)   
IV. Generalisation and conclusion  
As the focus of this issue of  Technique Financière et Développement is financial sector 
development, we want to conclude by taking a look at the importance of networks of special-
ised banks for small and very small enterprises.  
The role of any MSE bank in its respective financial sector depends very much on the country 
in which it operates. Of course, this also applies to the IMI affiliated banks. There is the case 
of Caja los Andes in Bolivia, a country which has for several years now suffered from a deep 
crisis. This institution is not only an extremely successful microfinance provider, but it has 
also become the most profitable bank in terms of RoE and the bank with the highest rate of 
loan loss provisions in the entire Bolivian banking system. Calpia in El Salvador has m ain-
tained its status as the clear market leader in the microfinance business over many years.   17
MEB Georgia is now among the three largest banks in the country. Typically, however, the 
share of the IMI banks in the respective banking system measured in terms of total assets is 
moderate, whereas their shares in lending to small and very small businesses is quite high and 
often the highest in the country.  
The IMI banks make a difference for the clientele which they aspire to serve, and thereby they 
also make a contribution to poverty alleviation. What may be more important, though, than 
the direct effect on poverty alleviation, is the function of bridging the gap, or filling in the 
“missing middle” in loan supply in these countries. With an average loan size of 2,000 € or 
USD, the IMI banks serve mostly very small local enterprises, but they are ready and able to 
continue supporting their clients also when they succeed in growing. In doing so they remove 
an important obstacle to the growth of their clientele’s businesses and contribute to the overall 
growth of employment and income.  
A number of other aspects in which the IMI experience is relevant for financial sector devel-
opment have already been mentioned. We only recall three of them here. 
Together with others with a similar orientation, especially the US based ACCION and their 
network of affiliated MSE banks, the IMI banks introduce a professional banking attitude into 
the business of microfinance, hopefully replacing two other prevailing attitudes in this area. 
One is that of established bankers: lending to small enterprises is necessarily a loss-making 
business. There is now sufficient evidence that this attitude is incorrect. One can hope that 
examples like that of the IMI banks will also inspire conventional banks to give up their 
reluctance vis-à-vis the MSE clientele.
6 The second attitude which is being replaced is that of 
the numerous credit-granting NGOs, which have traditionally not been conscious of the 
commercial aspects of their activities. Though with less determination than IPC/IMI and 
ACCION, many NGOs now also aspire to lower their costs, enforce repayment seriously and 
charge their clients cost-covering interest rates. Several donor agencies which support them 
have also started to exert some p ressure in this direction. It can be hoped that this 
development will sooner or later remove distortions in local micro-credit markets and 
strengthen the incentives of more commercial and private involvement in the MSB market 
segment.  
                                                 
6 In their contribution to a volume on "The Commercialisation of Microfinance", Momartz and Schor (2002) 
argue that it may be premature to assume that commercial lenders will soon take over the microfinance market in 
developing countries. The same holds for the transition economies, where the local banks as well as the banks 
from Western countries have been extremely hesitant to lower the lower limits of the amounts they lend to 
businesses.    18
Secondly, the commercially oriented networks of microfinance banks have employed and 
trained a large number of local staff some of whom will eventually transfer their attitudes and 
know-how to conventional banks and thereby contribute to filling in the “missing middle” in 
local loan supply. Moreover, local banking authorities are increasingly willing to accept 
microfinance providers and to supervise them seriously.  
Over the medium term, the role which “real” private capital plays in the respective banking 
markets will be very important. Especially in developing and transition economies the 
importance of private capital in banks is regarded as an indicator of financial sector quality. 
By now, most of the funding for MSE financing comes from public international or foreign 
donors, from private non-profit foundations and other private parties which have a special 
commitment to the clientele left behind by globalisation and transformation. This is very good 
for a certain time, but it cannot be the solution for long, not least because the funds of public 
and non-profit donors and investors are limited and because several IFIs have the rule that 
they must pull out of their developmental investments after a certain period. Therefore, much 
more private capital is needed, in the form of loans and even more so in the form of equity for 
MSE banks. IMI and similar networks play an important role here. Provided that they do their 
job well, they demonstrate that microbanking can be commercially successful and socially 
relevant and that the rewards of investing in MSE banks are higher and the risks lower than is 
generally assumed. Hopefully, this will encourage private capital to participate. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, they can also serve as an investment vehicle for those who want to 
combine a reasonable return with a socially responsible use of their savings. In fact, one of 
IMI's next challenges is to attract private capital to support the growth of the banks in the 
network. Success to date holds the promise that this objective can be fulfilled rather soon.    19
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